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Interest Analysis Meets the Jury Function
in an Alienation of Affections Action
David E. Seidelson*
Hollywood moguls were quick to learn that if Lassie did well at the
box office and Lassie, Come Home did even better, there just had to be
The Return of Lassie. And if Frankenstein and Dracula each meant
big business, Frankenstein Meets Dracula would be boffo. Had he been
consulted, Sam Goldwyn would have known that, given the widespread
judicial acceptance of interest analysis as a method of resolving choice-
of-law problems,' the enticing complexities of a jury trial and the sex
appeal of an action for alienation of affections and criminal conversa-
tion, Marra v. Bushee2 was a natural.
The action was brought in the United States District Court for the
District of Vermont,3 with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.
The plaintiff-wife was domiciled in New York; defendant was domiciled
in Vermont. According to the district court's opinion, defendant's
alleged improper conduct with plaintiff's husband had occurred in
Vermont. New York was the state of marital domicile. A choice-of-law
problem arose because New York had abolished such actions,4 and
Vermont had not. Recognizing its obligation under Klaxon v. Stentor
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. .[C]ourts or legislatures in at least 23 states and the District of Columbia have
rejected the place-of-wrong rule in some context. Rejection has usually been in the
form of a court decision revealing general acceptance of the premises of state-interest
analysis. The influence of the. new thinking has also been felt in federal courts
choosing state law in non-diversity cases, and in England.
E. SCOLES & R. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICr OF LAWS 463 (2d ed. 1972).
See note 6 infra.
2. 447 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir. 1971).
3. 317 F. Supp. 972 (1). Vt. 1970).
4. N.Y. Cir. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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Electric Manufacturing Co.,5 the district court looked to the opinions
of the highest appellate court of Vermont for guidance in resolving
the choice-of-law problem. The court discovered that the Supreme
Court of Vermont had never resolved that conflicts issue. In fact, the
district court determined that it was uncertain whether the Supreme
Court of Vermont would attempt such resolution through the applica-
tion of lex loci delicti or the more modern interest analysis approach. 6
The district court, following the lead of a much earlier opinion by
Judge Wyzanski in Gordon v. Parker,7 who had found himself con-
fronted with a similar problem in an analogous legal setting, utilized,
alternatively, lex loci delicti and interest analysis and concluded (hap-
pily) that both approaches led to the same conclusion: application of
Vermont law. The critical interest of Vermont which led to that con-
clusion through interest analysis was that state's legitimate concern
with regulating such conduct within its borders, the court having de-
cided that such conduct regulation (through deterrence) was a primary
reason for the Vermont law permitting such legal actions. So far, so
good, and, incidentally, wholly consistent with Judge Wyzanski's opin-
ion in Gordon.8 Then, from an adverse judgment in the amount of
$9,000, defendant appealed to the Second Circuit, and that court re-
versed and remanded for a new trial. The reason? The court of appeals
concluded that the district court had usurped a portion of the jury's
fact-finding function.
The opinion of the Second Circuit raises questions touching the
procedural aspects of a jury determination intimately related to a
choice-of-law decision and the most rational manner of resolving an
extraordinarily difficult conflicts problem. First, the complexity of the
jury trial.
5. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
6. After the Second Circuit's opinion in Marra, a federal district court, sitting in Ver-
mont and exercising diversity jurisdiction, found itself confronted with a choice-of-law de-
termination; the court concluded that the Supreme Court of Vermont would abandon lex
loci delicti in tort cases and "adopt the concept of principal contacts as the dominant
consideration." LeBlanc v. Stuart, 342 F. Supp. 773, 774 (D. Vt 1972). In LeBlanc, the
court ruled that the interspousal tort bar of the state of marital domicile (Rhode Island)
precluded wife from suing deceased husband's personal representative for injuries sus-
tained as a result of husband's allegedly negligent driving in Vermont.
7. 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass.), aff'd on other grounds, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949). In
Gordon, the action was brought in the federal district court in Massachusetts with juris-
diction based on diversity. Pennsylvania, the marital domicile, had abolished alienation
of affections actions. Massachusetts, the situs of defendant's conduct, permitted such
actions. The Pennsylvania statute, unlike that of New York, did not eliminate actions
for criminal conversation. Baldridge v. Matthews, 378 Pa. 566, 106 A.2d 809 (1954); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 170 (1935).
8. 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949).
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According to the Second Circuit, there had been conflicting evidence
at trial as to where the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct had
occurred, Vermont or New York. "Because the plaintiff made a general
demand for a jury trial, the defendant was entitled to the jury's con-
sideration of every issue properly triable to it .... One such issue was
the situs of defendant's conduct, a factual determination upon which
the choice of law turned."9 Since it had assumed "that a factual find-
ing territorializing the defendant's conduct was a jurisdictional matter
not within the province of the jury, the district court itself concluded
'that the conduct which constituted the alienation occurred principally
in Vermont and the applicable law is Vermont law.' "10 In so doing,
the district court violated the defendant's right to a jury determination
of that critical issue.
Either counsel for the plaintiff asserted, or the Second Circuit con-
sidered sua sponte, that because defendant had not requested an in-
struction directing the jury to determine the situs of defendant's
conduct, she had waived her right to such a jury finding. The district
court, however, determined that the failure to request the instruction
did not constitute a waiver. How the court arrived at that conclusion
is interesting.
"At the close of the plaintiff's case, and again at the conclusion of all
the evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict .... 11 The
motion for directed verdict at the close of the case was based "on the
ground that under the applicable conflicts of law rule of the State of
Vermont the law of New York governs this cause of action and New
York has abolished the cause of action of alienation of affections and
criminal conversation.' u 2 The district court reserved its ruling on
defendant's motion and submitted the case to the jury, which ulti-
mately returned the $9,000 verdict for the plaintiff. Defendant then
moved for a judgment non obstante veredicto. Subsequently, the court
denied that motion and defendant's earlier motion for a directed ver-
dict in a single opinion. That opinion stated, "The gravamen of
the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as
the previous motion for a directed verdict." 3 Then the district court
stated:
9. 447 F.2d at 1284 (citations omitted).
10. Id. at 1283.
11. Id.
12. 317 F. Supp. at 973.
13. Id.
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Defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
involves several choice of law questions which may be grouped
into two basic contentions.
First, the defendant maintains that under the traditional lex loci
delecti [sic] test the court must look to the law of the place of the
injury which, according to the defendant, is New York.
Second, the defendant contends that the modern significant rela-
tionship test adopted by the Vermont Supreme Court for applica-
tion to contractual choice of law problems should also be used in
the case of an intentional tort; and, that New York is the state with
the most significant relationship to the present causes of action.14
The Second Circuit concluded that defendant's never-made request for
a charge that the jury assign a situs to defendant's conduct "imme-
diately after the trial court had reserved decision on defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss, which framed squarely the choice of law issue, would
have been a duplication of procedural effort."' 5 Therefore, defendant
was "not... precluded from raising this error on appeal."'1 6 Now that's
puzzling. Neither of the "two basic contentions" underlying defendant's
motions for a directed verdict and a judgment non obstante veredicto
would seem to be the equivalent of a requested instruction that the
jury assign a situs to defendant's conduct. The first assertion is simply
lex loci delicti with the conclusion that plaintiff's injury was sustained
within the state of marital domicile, New York. The second rests upon
the assumed superior interest of New York as the state of marital
domicile. Both exist wholly separate and apart from where defendant's
conduct occurred; in fact, each subsists even assuming that the totality
of that conduct occurred in Vermont.
If one were willing to engage in speculation, it would become pos-
sible to-conjure up a basis for defendant's motion for directed verdict
in addition to the two set forth above in the district court's opinion.
Defendant could have determined that .the evidence required a finding
that her conduct had occurred solely in New York, thus eliminating
the. Vermont interest resting on conduct regulation, and requested a
directed verdict on the ground that Vermont had no other legitimate
interest in the issue, therefore New York's law, abolishing the cause
of action, should be applied. But clearly that basis for the motion
would not have been tantamount to a request that the jury be in-
structed to territorialize defendant's conduct. On the contrary, that
14. Id.
15. 447 F.2d at 1284-85.
16. Id. at 1285.
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assertion would have removed from the jury's consideration the situs
of the conduct, and, presumably, would have been just as inappropriate
as the district court's elimination of that function, in light of the con-
flicting evidence on the point found to exist in the record by the court
of appeals.It's difficult to imagine a basis for defendant's motion for a directed
verdict or for a judgment non obstante veredicto which would have
required a jury determination of where defendant's conduct occurred.
Indeed, the thrust of both motions would be to negate any such jury
function, since such motions generally rest on the assumption that jury
deliberation is not appropriate. If the Second Circuit was wrong in
reading defendant's motion for directed verdict as a "substitute" for a
requested instruction that the jury ascribe a situs to defendant's con-
duct, it was wrong in concluding that defendant had not waived such
a jury determination by failing to request it, simply because of the
motion for directed verdict. The only other rationale for the court's
finding that the defendant was free to raise the issue on appeal would
be "the so-called 'plain error' rule.' 7 Conceivably, defendant was
denied her seventh amendment 8 right to a jury trial because of coun-
sel's failure to request the appropriate jury determination. There are
two potential obstacles to use of the "plain error" rule in this context.
First, though "The 'plain error' rule is applicable in civil cases ...
it seems to be rarely used' 9 in non-criminal cases. And second, the
appellate court in its opinion never alluded to the rule. However, it
had potential applicability, so why not accept it as a satisfactory (albeit
tacit) basis for the court's finding? Still, for counsel in future cases in-
volving a choice-of-law determination requiring a jury finding, this
message should be clear: don't neglect to request a specific instruction
that the jury make the appropriate factual determination.
More basic (and more troubling) than the ratio decidendi for the
conclusion that defendant had not waived her right to a particularjury
determination is the Second Circuit's conclusion that resolution of the
choice-of-law problem depends on the jury's determination of where
defendant's conduct principally occurred. That conclusion creates
problems going, in intimately related ways, to the jury function in
17. J. McCovrmcK, HANDBOOK OF '[i1e LAW OF EVIDENCE 120 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as McCormick].
18. In Suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. ...
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
19. McCormick, supra note 17.
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practice, and, ultimately, to the basic conflicts problem. Perhaps the
most appropriate manner of testing the feasibility of the proposed
jury function is to see how it would work at retrial.20
The Second Circuit's opinion requires that the choice-of-law prob-
lem be resolved by the jury's determination of where defendant's al-
leged conduct principally occurred. If the conduct principally occurred
in New York, presumably the verdict must be for the defendant; if in
Vermont, the verdict may be for the plaintiff. Suppose that, after re-
ceiving such an instruction, the jury returns to advise the trial court
that it has found that 60 per cent of the defendant's conduct occurred in
New York and 40 per cent in Vermont, and to ask the court for further
guidance. What should the court do? The trial judge, already reversed
once in the case, probably would be uniquely sensitive to the possibility
of a second reversal. Permitting a verdict for the plaintiff on a finding
that less than half of defendant's conduct occurred in Vermont might
not be wholly consistent with the appellate court's conclusion that
where defendant's conduct principally occurred would be "determina-
tive of the choice of law principles." 21 Does that mean that the trial
judge, confronted with a sixty-forty division of defendant's conduct
"favoring" New York, should instruct the jury that its verdict must be
for the defendant? Perhaps not. The sixty-forty split may be the result of
quantitative analysis only, without regard for the relative alienating
effect of each portion of the defendant's conduct. And, while the
Second Circuit did refer to where defendant's conduct "principally" 22
occurred, it alluded also to the situs of the "alluring" 23 conduct and
the "decisive ' 24 conduct, although, admittedly, it did say that the court
should "employ the law of the state in which the defendant's conduct
primarily occurred." 25 What's a poor trial judge to do, especially one
still smarting from the sting of reversal in the same case?
Perhaps the first step would be to assure that the jury's determination
of situs was the product of qualitative, as well as quantitative, analysis.
The trial judge, mindful of the Second Circuit's adjectival inconstancy
(and still eager to avoid a second reversal) might be wise to utilize
20. Plaintiff has determined not to pursue the case, therefore no retrial will occur.
Telephone conversations with Ralph Foote, Esq., counsel for the plaintiff, Feb. 20 &
July 3, 1973.
21. 447 F.2d at 1285.
22. Id. at 1283.
23. Id. at 1284.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1283 (emphasis added).
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"alluring" and "decisive" in describing the alleged wrongful conduct
of the defendant in his charge to the jury and to instruct them (assum-
ing they find such conduct to have occurred) to determine where such
"alluring," "decisive" conduct "principally," that is to say, "primarily,"
occurred. Suppose he does, and suppose, too, that the jury returns to
advise the court that it has determined that 60 per cent of the defen-
dant's alluring, decisive conduct occurred in New York and 40 per cent
in Vermont, and asks the court for additional guidance. Now what? Is
the jury's finding that 60 per cent of defendant's alluring, decisive con-
duct occurred in New York equivalent to a finding that defendant's
"legally significant" (let's see the Second Circuit top that) conduct oc-
curred primarily and principally in New York? If so, of course, the trial
judge should advise the jury that, given the factual determination stated,
its verdict should be for the defendant. But the trial judge might be wise
to avoid that. After all, how can he be certain (short of a second appel-
late review) that 60 per cent is the primary and principal part of the
defendant's total alluring, decisive conduct, in the sense that the court
of appeals referred to the principal and primary part of that conduct?
The safest course for the trial court would seem to be to reinstruct the
jury that, assuming it finds alluring, decisive conduct by the defendant,
it must determine where that conduct principally and primarily
occurred, New York or Vermont. If it finds that the conduct principally
and primarily occurred in New York, its verdict must be for defendant.
If it finds that such conduct principally and primarily occurred in Ver-
mont, its verdict may be for the plaintiff. Parenthetically and silently,
the trial judge might very well append, "And please, folks, no per-
centage splits."
With such additional guidance, the jury might return with its ver-
dict for either party depending, in critical part, upon its determination
of where defendant's alluring, decisive conduct, principally and pri-
marily occurred, assuming a finding that it occurred at all. To assure
that the jury properly "territorialized" defendant's conduct, and did
not react improperly to either the evidence or the court's instructions,
counsel and the court could prepare and submit special interrogatories
to the jury requiring special verdicts as to whether or not defendant
had alienated the affections of plaintiff's husband, and, if so, whether
the alluring, decisive conduct occurred principally and primarily in
New York or Vermont. If the jury answers the first interrogatory "Yes"
and the second "Vermont," the general verdict would be for the plain-
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tiff. If the first answer were "Yes" and the second "New York," the
general verdict would have to be for the defendant. That, presumably,
would meet with the approval of the Second Circuit. And that, in turn,
raises a question as to the propriety of the Second Circuit's opinion as
to the basic conflicts issue.
The foundation of Vermont's interest is the occurrence of defen-
dant's (alleged) conduct in that state. Assuming that a significant por-
tion of that conduct did occur in Vermont, that state's interest is a
rather intense one. As Vermont views such conduct, it is intentionally
wrongful. That characterization of the conduct creates two legally sig-
nificant consequences: (1) the relative degree of culpability of the con-
duct is very high, compared, for example, with merely negligent con-
duct, and (2) it is uniquely susceptible to deterrence, compared, for
example, with mere momentary inadvertence. That high degree of
culpability and unique susceptibility to deterrence combine to enhance
rather dramatically Vermont's interest in regulating such conduct
within its borders. Under the Second Circuit's mandate, a jury could
determine that, although a significant portion of defendant's conduct
occurred in Vermont, the principal and primary portion occurred in
New York. Given such a finding and the court's mandate, the verdict
would have to be for the defendant. That, of course, would frustrate
Vermont's interest in conduct regulation through the deterrent sting
of civil damages. The critical question then becomes: Has New York
any interests sufficiently significant to justify the frustration of Ver-
mont's keen interest?
The original New York statute abolishing actions for alienation of
affections contained its own statement of public policy:
The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement
of actions based upon allegel [alleged] alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry,
having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoy-
ance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many
persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were
merely the victims of circumstances, and such remedies having
been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrich-
ment, and such remedies having furnished vehicles for the com-
mission or attempted commission of crime and in many cases
having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared
as the public policy of the state that the best interests of the people
of the state will be served by the abolition of such remedies.
Vol. 12: 1, 1973
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Consequently, in the public interest, the necessity for the enact-
ment of this article is hereby declared as a matter of legislative
determination.2 6
Although that section is no longer a part of the New York statute
abolishing such actions, its statement of public policy could be treated
as having continuing viability, for two reasons. First, the last section of
the existing statute expressly refers to the public policy stated in the
statute.2 7 Since the original policy statement was never supplanted by
a different one in statutory form, the reference could be read as one
going to the original. Second, the policy considerations set forth in
the original statute tend to coincide with the reasons generally offered
for the enactment of the so-called "Heart Balm" statutes in the 1930's.28
26. Wawrzin v. Rosenberg, 12 F. Supp. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). The court offers this cita-
tion to the original statute:
Section 61 -a of the Civil Practice Act of the State of New York, in chapter 263 of the
Laws of 1935 .
Id.
27. Id.
This article shall be liberally construed to to effectuate its objects and purposes and
the public policy of the state as hereby declared ....
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 84 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
28. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 267 (1968) states:
A recognition that the suit for alienation of affections produces serious abuses and
is open to nany policy objections has led to the enactment of "Heart Balm" statutes
abolishing the action in eleven states. One other state, Pennsylvania, has abolished the
action as against strangers. Louisiana has refused to recognize the action by judicial
decision.,
For all these reasons the abolishing statutes reflect a sound public policy and ought
to be enacted more widely than they are.
A. JACOBS & J. GOEBEL, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 495-96 (4th.
ed. 1961) states:
At the time of the first spate of Heart Balm statutes, the impulse to legislate ap-
pears to have emanated from writing in legal and other periodicals. The conclusion
that alienation was a species of blackmail action was never supported by statistics, but
rather by inferences drawn from cases where the damages awarded were on their face
excessive. Whatever may be the criticisms levelled at the action, there always inhered
in it a social purpose, viz., a sanction against one who subverts the marital relation,
the preservation of which is a concern of the state. Since 1941 a profound change has
taken place in the pattern of American life with the dispersion of humans far from
their domiciles, particularly in military service. This has resulted in a factual separa-
tion of spouses in circumstances that make difficult or impossible the husband's ful-
fillment of the role of protector of the marital relation. Where the alienation remedy
has not been abolished, justice to such persons requires that it be not so hedged with
restrictions that the remedy is made useless to them. There have been enough cases
involving military personnel in recent appellate reports to indicate that their plight
is at least as worthy of consideration as the discouragement of legal blackmail.
Given the divergent views expressed in those two excerpts (see text at note 29). it be-
comes interesting to speculate how a court twilling to consider the "better rule of law"
as a "choice influencing consideration" would react to the choice-of-law problem presented.
Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 573,
267 A.2d 854, 859 (1970) (dissenting opinion); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157
N.W.2d 579 (1968); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice Influencing Considerations,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584, 1587 (1966); Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts
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Professor Clark offers perhaps the most perceptive and succinct
statement of those reasons:
The reasons underlying abolition of alienation of affections are
many and persuasive. One is the opportunities for blackmail which
the action provides, since the mere bringing of the action can ruin
the defendant's reputation. Another is that lack of any reasonably
definite standards for assessing damages and the possibility of
punitive damages makes excessive verdicts likely. Still another is
the peculiar light which the whole proceeding throws on the
nature of marriage, leaving one with the conviction that the suc-
cessful plaintiff has engaged in something which looks very much
like a forced sale of his spouse's affections. Most significantly of
all, the action for alienation is based upon psychological assump-
tions that are contrary to fact. As has been indicated, viable, con-
tented marriages are not broken up by the vile seducer of the
Nineteenth Century melodrama, although this is what the suit for
alienation assumes. In fact, the break-up is the product of many
influences. It is therefore misleading and futile to suppose that the
threat of a damage suit can protect the marital relationship. For
all these reasons the abolishing statutes reflect a sound public
policy and ought to be enacted more widely than they are.29
The fear that an action for alienation of affections lends itself to
blackmail, simply by the threat of initiation, and the fear of excessive
verdicts, when litigation is actually initiated and terminated, would
seem to be concerns focused primarily upon a misuse of the judicial
system and an imposition on the courts. While those may be rather
acute concerns on the part of New York and other states having en-
Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 267, 296 (1966). With a direct, abrasive and seemingly irrecon-
cilable conflict between the interests of the state having abolished the action and the
state having retained it, would the forum be tempted to label one of those laws "better"
as a method of resolving the conflict? And would the temptation be enhanced if the forum
were one of the interested states? If the forum were the state with a "Heart Balm" statute,
one can almost imagine the emphasis the court would place on the evils intended to be
eliminated by the legislative enactment and on the enlightened view expressed by the
statute. If the forum were the state which permitted the action, it is as easy to imagine
the judicial emphasis on the numerical majority of the states which continue to permit
the action and on the relative absence of legislative activity aimed at abolishing the action
since "the first spate of 'Heart Balm' statutes." For adverse reaction to consideration of
the better rule of law as a legitimate choice influencing factor, see Seidelson, Interest
Analysis: For Those Who Like It and Those Who Don't, 11 DuQ. L. REV. 283, 307-08
(1973); Seidelson, Comment on Cipolla v. Shaposka, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 423 (1971).
As to the efficacy and wisdom of the action for alienation of affections, the views of
this author coincide with those stated by Professor Clark in this text at note 29; however,
an effort has been made by the author to prevent those views from intruding into the
suggested resolution of the choice-of-law problem dealt with in this article, since it is
felt that those personal views neither enhance nor diminish the interests of the competing
states.
29. H. CLARK, Tssa LAW OF DomEsrsc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 267 (1968).
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acted "Heart Balm" statutes, they tend not to be convertible into sig-
nificant interests on the part of New York in Marra, since the ac-
tion was brought against a Vermont defendant in a federal district
court in Vermont.8 0 Similarly, concern over a "forced sale" of the
affections of plaintiff's spouse would seem to be a concern focused
primarily upon an imposition on the court involved in the transaction,
and, likewise, not convertible into a significant New York interest in
Marra. Frankly, the remaining reasons set forth by Professor Clark
seem not to be reflected in the New York statutory statement of public
policy. Therefore, looking only to that statutory recitation of legisla-
tive determination, one could assert that New York has no significant
interest in having its law applied in Marra. Consequently, the frustra-
tion of Vermont's keen interest resting comfortably on the commission
of a significant, though less than principal, portion of defendant's con-
duct there, would be wholly without justification. But that may be too
hasty and just a bit unfair to New York. Conceivably, that early state-
ment of public policy may not have been reenacted by the New York
legislature precisely because it was deemed not adequately inclusive.
In which case, it could be asserted, the present reference in the last
section of the statute to the public policy expressed by the statute
should be read as a reference to the broadest public policy one can
discern in the existing statute. That construction would be consistent
with that section's injunction to apply the statute liberally.3 1 And, that,
in turn, would encompass as reasons for the statute all those offered by
Professor Clark and as many more as the mind of man can rationally
conceive.
One reason not explicitly noted by Professor Clark, but earlier re-
ferred to by Judge Wyzanski in considering Pennsylvania's "Heart
Balm" statute,3 2 was that state's concern "with not having Pennsylvania
30. In Wawrzin v. Rosenberg, 12 F. Supp. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1935), the court permitted an
alienation of affections action in a federal district court sitting in New York, where the
defendant's acts occurred in New Jersey, notwithstanding New York's "Heart Balm"
statute. New York courts themselves have demonstrated a laudable recognition of their
constitutional obligation under the full faith and credit clause and an appropriate sen-
sitivity to the concept of comity. In Parker v. Hoefer, 2 N.Y.2d 612, 142 N.E.2d 194,
162 N.Y.S.2d 13, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957), full faith and credit was extended to a
Vermont judgment arising out of an action for alienation of affections and criminal con-
versation. See Seidelson, Full Faith and Credit: A Modest Proposal . . . Or Two, 31
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 462 (1962). In Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146
(1958), comity was extended to a Canadian judgment arising out of an action for seduction
and criminal conversation.
31. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 84 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 170 (1965).
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courts hear this sordid type of controversy."," If that concern be read
as a reason for the New York statute, it also seems to go directly toward
a desire to "shelter" New York courts, both judges and juries, in this
instance, from the specifics of the evidence likely to be adduced in such
a case. Once more, this is not a legitimate New York interest in a case
being tried before a federal judge and a jury sitting in Vermont. Well,
back to Professor Clark's reasons.
His elimination of the "vile seducer" as a cause of disruption of a
contended marriage and his conclusion that "the threat of a damage
suit" cannot "protect the marital relationship" go directly to the essence
of the relationship and reflect a very lucid view of it. The view is that
an action for alienation of affections is not a meaningful method of
preserving marital tranquility. Imputing that same view to New York,
and accepting it as a reason for New York's law, can give rise to a
legitimate interest on the part of that state in the facts of Marra. After
all, New York was the state of marital domicile. Certainly that state
should be deemed to have the most acute interest in preserving mar-
riages based there. And apparently New York has concluded that the
maintenance of an action for alienation of affections is not an appro-
priate mode of preserving marriage. Chalk up one legitimate interest
for New York.
There is another potential reason for New York's law, reflected
neither in that state's explicit "public policy" nor in Professor Clark's
statement. It is, however, intimated by language in Judge Wyzanski's
opinion in Gordon, in fact, in the same sentence quoted in part above.
In its entirety, that sentence reads, "Pennsylvania was concerned with
not having Pennsylvania courts hear this sorid type of controversy and
not having Pennsylvania citizens and visitors called upon to defend
actions which have so often been motivated by spiteful or ulterior
purposes. '34 The italicized portion of that language suggests a concern
on the part of the state having enacted a "Heart Balm" statute with
affording all those within the state, more or less permanently as
domiciliaries or just temporarily as visitors, with a certain freedom of
action.3 5 More precisely, the language indicates an interest in assuring
33. 83 F. Supp. at 43.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Rather strangely, the sentence in Judge Wyzanski's opinion immediately following
the sentence quoted in the text at note 34 offers this view of Pennsylvania's statute:
"Pennsylvania has spoken qua possible forum and qua possible state of defendant's dom-
icil .. " Id. Somewhere between that sentence and the immediately preceding sentence,
the court seems to have misplaced Pennsylvania's concern for "visitors" to that state.
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those who act within the state that those actions will not be used ad-
versely against them in a subsequent alienation of affections suit. That
certainly is convertible into a significant New York interest in Marra
as to those acts of the defendant which may have occurred in New York.
So one may identify two New York interests in having New York
law applied in Marra: (1) a determination that a New York domiciled
marriage does not require and will not be abetted by an alienation of
affections action, and (2) a desire to afford those acting within New
York freedom from concern that those acts may result in civil liability
in an alienation of affections action. The chore now is to determine
if either or both of those interests justify frustration of Vermont's in-
terest in conduct regulation if defendant's conduct occurred principally
in New York, albeit significantly in Vermont as well.
First, an examination of New York's determination that marriages
do not require the protective umbrella of potential alienation of affec-
tions actions is necessary. If Vermont's interest were based entirely on
its determination that marital tranquility or stability was enhanced
by the threat of civil action against the "vile seducer," that interest
would be insignificant compared with New York's contrary conclusion.
Since plaintiff's marital domicile was New York, it is that state which
would have the overriding interest in deciding what litigative oppor-
tunities were and were not appropriate to protect and preserve that
marriage. However, Vermont's significant interest is conduct regula-
tion through deterrence, rather than preservation of the marriage. It
may be true that some portion of Vermont's desire to deter such con-
duct within its borders is predicated upon its conclusion that the con-
duct threatens marital tranquility. To the extent that that concern ex-
plains the deterrent aspirations of Vermont, that state's interest in
conduct regulation would seem subservient to the interests of New
York as marital domicile. In effect, New York's law says to Vermont's
wish to preserve the New York marriage by means of an alienation of
affections action: "Thanks, but no thanks." It could be concluded,
however, that Vermont's conduct-regulating purpose goes beyond
preservation of the marriage and is intended to deter conduct which
those in Vermont look upon as unpalatable per se. Indeed, in an
analogous situation, judge Wyzanski wrote:
To be sure, tort law also always has a compensatory element. But
that is of secondary consequence where, as in the tort of aliena-
tion of affections, the principal reason why the state stamps con-
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duct as wrongful is that so many people regard it as sinful, so many
regard it as offensive to public morals, and so many are likely to
take matters into their own hands if public tribunals are not avail-
able.3 6
After citing with approval the decision in Gordon, the Second Circuit
in Marra rephrased that language this way:
Where the compensatory element dominant in negligence ac-
tions is supplanted by the punitive interest accompanying the
state's attempt to control and deter injurious behavior, the de-
fendant's conduct, and not the domicile of the aggrieved spouse,
was considered determinative of the law to be employed.
3 7
So, assuming there is a Vermont interest in conduct regulation which
goes beyond preservation of the marital status, Vermont retains a
legitimate interest notwithstanding the New York domicile of the mar-
riage. Moreover, that interest in regulation through deterrence would
seem to be superior to New York's interest arising out of its conclusion
that such civil liability is neither necessary nor appropriate to preserve
the marriage. After all, even if New York is correct in its determina-
tion that an alienation of affections action will not preserve and should
not be utilized as an instrument for attempting to preserve a marriage,
how is New York's interest as marital domicile critically frustrated by
the application of Vermont law? If it doesn't work, it does not work,
and the New York marriage may not be preserved. That, presumably,
is what would happen if New York law were applied. Conversely, non-
application of Vermont law, or, if the reader prefers, application of
New York law, would indeed frustrate Vermont's interest. If the de-
fendant is given immunity from civil liability for that portion of her
conduct which occurred in Vermont, she and others may not be dis-
suaded from engaging in similar conduct in Vermont so long as the
marital domicile is in New York (or some other state having a "Heart
Balm" statute) and there exists the possibility of a factual determina-
tion that the conduct did not occur principally in Vermont.
There is another potential factor to be considered in weighing the
competing interests of New York and Vermont. It could be asserted
that utilization of Vermont's law permitting the alienation of affections
action would jeopardize the New York based marriage because of the
nature of the evidence required and the quasi-adverse roles of plaintiff-
36. Id. at 42.
37. 447 F.2d at 1284.
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wife and allegedly dalliant husband. If that assertion were accepted,
New York's interest in preserving the marital status of its domiciled
spouses would be enhanced. Acceptance, however, is difficult. There is
nothing in New York law or policy (including the original statutory
policy) to indicate that the purpose of the elimination of alienation of
affections actions was to preserve marital tranquility. The most that
can be said is that New York simply does not consider such an action
as an appropriate means of preservation-at least in part because of its
refusal to accept the "vile seducer" as a significant cause of marital dis-
cord. Moreover, the existence of the action in those states which retain
it is explicable, at least in part, by a determination, however well or
poorly founded, that the action or the possibility of the action tends to
preserve the marital status by dissuading the potential seducer. Whether
or not one shares that view, one should be reluctant to conclude that
elimination of the action was intended to preserve marriages, absent
any indicia in the statute, legislative history, or decisions of the state
having eliminated the action.
Ultimately, the essence of the conflict between New York and Ver-
mont comes down to this: New York would have the defendant enjoy
immunity from civil liability for her conduct in that state, thus assur-
ing her an enhanced freedom of action in that state, and Vermont
would have the defendant susceptible to civil liability for her conduct
in that state, thus deterring such conduct. And that really is a direct
and abrasive conflict. Rather obviously, each state has the capacity and
right to affect such conduct within its borders, whether the intention
is to facilitate or deter the conduct. Moreover, each state's right to
affect the conduct is complemented by an interest in the consequences
of that conduct. New York, as marital domicile, certainly has an appro-
priate interest in determining that defendant's conduct within that
state poses no significant threat to the tranquility of a New York mar-
riage, and Vermont has an appropriate interest in determining that
defendant's conduct in that state is so "offensive to public morals" and
so likely to stimulate private retaliation that civil liability must be
imposed. New York, with legitimate concerns and interests, tells the
defendant: "You may act with knowledge that your conduct will not
give rise to civil liability." Vermont, with its own legitimate concerns
and interests, says: "Thou shalt not." Which interests should prevail
when the defendant's conduct occurs principally and primarily in New
York but significantly in Vermont?
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Conceivably, the defendant could argue that she had relied upon the
legal immunity granted by New York law and that, therefore, the im-
position of liability would frustrate her reasonable expectations. The
argument lacks persuasiveness, however, as to that significant portion
of defendant's conduct which occurred in Vermont. As to that portion
of her conduct, defendant could constitutionally and reasonably be
said to have acted with knowledge of Vermont's liability-imposing law.
Apparently the application of either state's law would do no violence
to defendant's expectations. There remains that very direct conflict
between the laws of the two states: one, through its permissiveness (at
least in the sense of immunity from civil liability), attempting to assure
freedom of action within its borders; and the other, through the sting
of civil liability, attempting to deter such action within its borders.
It could be asserted that the divergent interests of New York and
Vermont are affected (and perhaps mitigated) by each state's criminal
law. Both states label adultery as criminal conduct.38 Therefore, at
38. "A person who commits adultery shall be imprisoned not more than five years or
fined not more than $1,000.00, or both."' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 201 (1971). "A married
man and an unmarried woman who commit an act which would be adultery if such
woman were married shall each be guilty of adultery." Id. § 202.
"A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another
person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse.
Adultery is a class B misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 255.17 (McKinney 1967). All mis-
demeanors are classified in New York as "Class A," "Class B" or "Unclassified." Id. § 55.05
A "Class B" misdemeanor is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed three
months. Id. § 70.15, or a fine not to exceed $500, Id. § 80.05.
The Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code
recommended that the offense of adultery ... be omitted from the revised Penal Law.
A majority of the Commission was of the opinion that the basic problem is one of
private rather than public morals, and that its inclusion in a criminal code neither
protects the public nor acts as a deterrent. It was further noted that proscribing
conduct which is almost universally overlooked by law enforcement agencies tends to
weaken the fabric of the whole penal law. The Legislature, however, rejected the
Commission's recommendation and enacted § 255.17....
Id. § 255.17 (commentary immediately following).
Unlike New York, Oregon has abolished the criminal offense of adultery. ORE. LAws
ch. 743, § 432, repealing ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.005 (1971). However, "'criminal conversation'
by act of sexual intercourse with a married woman is still a tort in Oregon." Myers v.
Brickwedel, 259 Ore. 457, 467 n.6, 486 P.2d 1286, 1291 n.6 (1971). In Brichwedel, the
court was confronted with a jurisdictional problem. Plaintiff-husband, a resident of
California, sued defendant, a resident of California, for alienation of affections and crim-
inal conversation. " ... [A]ctions for damages for alienation of affections and criminal con-
versation, although still permitted in Oregon, have been abolished in California. Section
43.5 California Civil Code." Id. at 459, 456 P.2d at 1287. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
had criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife in Oregon. Jurisdiction was asserted under
Oregon's long-arm statute. ORE. REV. STAT. § 14.035 (1963) ("commission of a tortious act
within this state"). Defendant asserted, inter alia, that because plaintiff, like defendant,
was a nonresident of Oregon, the court should not assert jurisdiction. The court con-
cluded that the long-arm statute was applicable and that the assertion of jurisdiction was
consistent with due process. See Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendants:
Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DuQ. L. RaV. 221 (1968).
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least as far as the criminal conversation is concerned, both provide
criminal penalties. This could be read as a significant repression of the
freedom of action extended by New York's abolition of civil damages
for criminal conversation and, by extension, for alienation of affections
as well. If a state is prepared to punish conduct criminally, so the asser-
tion would go, it assumes a rather awkward posture by proclaiming
simultaneously that it wishes to encourage freedom of action in regard
to that same conduct. Still, the assertion is not easily accepted' Whether
awkward or not, New York has the sovereign capacity to assume just
such a posture, and one should be extremely circumspective about
minimizing a state's interest in a choice-of-law context because of one's
disagreement with the policy underlying that interest. Moreover, New
York can offer a rational explanation for its apparent ambiguity
toward the conduct. While criminal prosecution is available and con-
viction therefore possible, such an ultimate result can occur only after
a state-initiated apparatus is stimulated and guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt established. Those control devices, lacking in a civil action, pro-
vide an assurance adequate (to New York) that the abuses apprehended
in such civil litigation will not occur in criminal prosecutions. Thus,
the freedom of action and freedom of anxiety of spurious suits intended
to be effected by the "Heart Balm" statute will be realized. Conversely,
it could be asserted that Vermont's criminal law, imposing penalties
for adultery, provides a meaningful deterrent to such conduct in that
state, and, therefore, -mitigates that state's interest in deterring such
conduct by the threat of civil liability. The short answer to the asser-
tion is that Vermont, in its sovereign wisdom, apparently believes
otherwise. That belief may be "justified" by Vermont's determination
that private actions seeking money damages and not requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt serve as an effective complementary method
of dissuading would-be adulterers. Thus, the competing interests of
the states-one attempting to assure freedom of action without fear
of civil liability, the other seeking to deter such conduct by the specter
of such liability-subsist even after examination of each state's crim-
inal law and are apparently in irreconcilable conflict. New York con-
tinues to assure freedom of social intercourse without fear of civil
liability and Vermont threatens compensatory and punitive damages
for the very same communion. How is the conflict to be resolved?
There are two basic alternatives in addition to the solution offered
by the Second Circuit in Marra. The first is to make the difficult deci-
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sion as to which state's interest is superior, given 60 per cent of defen-
dant's conduct in New York and 40 per cent in Vermont. Once that
decision is made, the law of the state having the superior interest would
be applied to the totality of defendant's conduct and the choice-of-law
problem is thus resolved. Deciding which state's interest is superior is
made agonizing by the knowledge that not only are the competing inter-
ests absolutely divergent-New York's legitimate interest in permitting
such conduct without fear of civil liability and Vermont's legitimate
interest in deterring such conduct by civil liability-but selection of
either state's law will necessarily and significantly frustrate the legiti-
mate interest of the other state. If New York's law is applied and the
defendant held free from liability, she will have flouted Vermont's law
and its keen interest in discouraging such conduct in that state. If
Vermont's law is applied and the defendant held liable, she will have
imposed upon her civil damages for conduct done in New York which
that state specifically desires to be liability-free. Vermont's deterrent
interest is hardly diminished simply because less than half bf defend-
ant's total conduct may have occurred in that state, so long as a legally
significant portion of the conduct occurred there; and certainly New
York's "protective" interest is great where more than half of defend-
ant's total conduct occurred there. The choice-of-law problem is
uniquely difficult.
Since the defendant's conduct, as viewed by Vermont, is not merely
legally inappropriate but intentionally wrongful and intolerable as
well, irrespective of its consequences on the "threatened" marriage,
that state's interest would seem superior to the interest of New York.
Where a state determines that conduct is intentionally wrongful, un-
palatable and susceptible to deterrence through the imposition of
money damages, the state has expressed its sovereign interest in the
strongest manner available short of constitutional mandate or criminal
sanction. That expression should not be ignored absent a countervailing
state interest of the most urgent significance. While New York may be
strongly concerned with affording freedom of action, that concern
seems to lack the necessary degree of urgency. New York's permissive
view of the conduct involved, admittedly a legitimate and significant
interest on the part of that state, falls somewhat short of Vermont's
emphatic "Thou shalt not."
In brief, where there is a sharply divergent conflict between the
legitimate interests of two states, each concerned with conduct occur-
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ring in both, and one state desires to permit the conduct to be free
from the possibility of civil liability and the other to deter such (in its
view) intentionally wrongful conduct through the sting of civil lia-
bility, the admonitory interest should be deemed paramount. Ad-
mittedly, that decision is arbitrary, in the sense that, ultimately, every
decision becomes arbitrary. Admittedly, too, the decision does frustrate
New York's legitimate interest in assuring that such conduct within
its borders shall be immune from the inhibiting effect of potential
liability. Is there a means of resolving the choice-of-law problem in a
rational manner without frustrating that legitimate New York interest
and, simultaneously, fulfilling Vermont's deterrent interest?
There seems to be such an alternative resolution. Each state's in-
terest in conduct, whether permissive or prohibitory, is primarily an
interest in that conduct which occurred within the state. New York's
most urgent interest is in assuring freedom from civil liability to that
conduct which occurred in New York. 39 Vermont's concern with deter-
ring such conduct is directed at that conduct which occurred in that
state. Given 60 per cent of defendant's conduct in New York and 40 per
cent in Vermont, it would make sense to apply the law of each state to
that portion of the conduct which occurred within that state. In that
manner, each state's most significant interest is served and neither
state's policy is significantly frustrated. That result can be achieved in
the following manner.
If, during the trial, evidence is adduced which would justify jury
determinations that defendant committed the alleged conduct and her
conduct occurred in both New York and Vermont, the trial court
should instruct the jury that, if it finds that defendant's conduct did
occur in New York and Vermont, it must determine what percent of
the conduct occurred in each state. Such a percentage determination
should be less difficult than might at first appear. After all, in Marra,
the Second Circuit would require the jury to decide where the conduct
principally and primarily occurred. That decision would seem inher-
ently to lead the jury to a percentage division of the conduct. Indeed,
such a percentage division would appear to be more rational than a
jury determination assigning an exclusive situs to the principal and
primary alluring and decisive conduct, where such conduct occurred in
39. N.Y. civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney Supp. 1972) provides: "No act done within
this state shall operate to give rise, either within or without this state, to any such right
of action .... (emphasis added).
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two states. How does one go about determining such a single situs of
the decisive, alluring conduct? The personal relationships between
man and woman may encompass sexual activities, dinners and picnics.
They may include everything from the most intimate t~te--tte to a
dos-A-dos of a barn dance. Whatever else those activities may be, they
tend to form a continuum with each part affecting the relationship,
either cementing it more closely together or threatening its deteriora-
tion. In determining in which of two states the decisive, alluring con-
duct principally and primarily occurred, is the fact finder to count
incidents of sexual intercourse, dinners, picnics, quiet evenings, dances,
parties, walks, shopping trips, car rides, concerts and movies attended
and lounges visited in each of the two states, then determine in which
state more of those events occurred and characterize that state as the
principal situs? Or is the fact finder, in addition, to attempt to assign
to each such event a relative degree of efficacy in cementing or threat-
ening the relationship between husband and defendant, then weigh
that qualitative analysis along with the quantitative analysis in deter-
mining in which state the alluring conduct principally occurred? And
what if the jury, however instructed by the trial court, determines
that the alluring conduct occurred evenly in both states? It would
seem more reasonable and more in keeping with reality to anticipate
that the jury would realize that the relationship between husband and
defendant was a continuing one with separate but emotionally related
events occurring in both states, and would therefore be better able to
assign a percentage division to the totality of events than an exclusive
situs of decisiveness to one state. Anticipating such percentage division,
the trial court should instruct the jury that, if it determines that plain-
tiff is entitled to compensatory damages, it should determine the full
amount of those damages in accordance with the court's instructions
and then reduce that amount in the same degree that defendant's con-
duct is found to have occurred in New York. Thus, if the full amount
of compensatory damages is $20,000 and 60 per cent of defendant's con-
duct occurred in New York, the jury should award plaintiff as compen-
satory damages 40 per cent of $20,000, or $8,000.40 Since the
compensatory damages awarded by the jury will represent the dollar
40. The proportional verdict suggested will be familiar to those courts utilizing com-
parative negligence statutes. See, e.g., the comparative negligence section of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1972):
The fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not
bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to such employee ....
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value of the loss of affections suffered by her, care should be taken to
avoid inflicting a gratuitous slap in the plaintiff's face by an apparently
low verdict. That can be accomplished by requiring the jury to respond
to interrogatories in the form of special verdicts which will indicate the
totality of compensatory damages suffered by plaintiff, the percentage
division of where defendant's conduct occurred and the ultimate per-
centage reduction of the total compensatory damages. Now, how about
punitive damages? The amount of punitive damages should be the
amount deemed appropriate to deter defendant and others from engag-
ing in similar conduct in the future in Vermont. The "similar conduct"
referred to is that wrongful conduct of the defendant which occurred in
Vermont.
The application of the law of each interested state to that portion
of defendant's conduct which occurred in that state is a choice-of-law
resolution which may not be susceptible to general application. How-
ever, it seems particularly appropriate to the facts of Marra and other
cases which may present a similar set of circumstances. In Marra (and
perhaps in other cases), the conflicting laws of the competing states
were aimed in significant part at conduct regulation, one law immuniz-
ing the conduct from civil liability to provide the actor with freedom
from such concern, the other amercing the actor as a means of deterring
the conduct. The conduct occurred in both states and the totality of
the conduct is amendable to a percentage division as to the portion
occurring in each state. It should be noted, too, that what is being sug-
gested is not that the forum make an aloof and quasi-equitable 4' deter-
mination that, since the laws of the two states are in irreconcilable con-
flict, the forum should simply "split the difference" and apply a law
alien to both states. Rather, the suggestion is that the forum apply the
law of each state to that conduct which occurred within that state.
Such a resolution and the resulting verdict would seem to serve the
significant interests of both states, while not unduly affecting the in-
terests of the parties to the litigation. New York's interests in permit-
ting such conduct in New York without fear of civil liability would
41. In Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1967), the Supreme
Court of Michigan retained lex lod delicti rather than embrace the "heady stuff" of interest
analysis, at least in part because of the court's concern that interest analysis "would
authorize the trial judge to make discretionary choices, from one or indeed more of
several conflicting jurisdictions, of laws he as a matter of discretion deems most equitable
for application to the evidentiary proof of the 'complex' case before him." Id. at 519,
170 N.W.2d at 141. For adverse comment on Abendschein, see Seidelson, Interest Analy-
sis: For Those Who Like It and Those Who Don't, 11 DUQ. L. Rzv. 283 (1973).
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be satisfied since the portion of defendant's conduct which occurred
in that state would result in no liability being imposed on defendant.
Vermont's interest in deterring such conduct in Vermont would be
served by the imposition of compensatory damages to the degree that
defendant's conduct occurred in that state, and that same conduct
would result in the additional sting of punitive damages. The plaintiff
would seem to have no legitimate complaint that her recovery was
diminished because of New York's permissive law; given the significant
interest of New York in the choice-of-law problem presented, such
utilization of its law would not be untoward. Similarly, the defendant
could not legitimately complain about the imposition of compensatory
and punitive damages arising from her intentionally wrongful conduct
in Vermont, as Vermont views that conduct. Thus, the solution sug-
gested, while not unduly imposing on either litigant, fulfills the sig-
nificant interest of each of the competing states in a case in which those
interests are in nearly irreconcilable conflict, and that's quite a bit to
say about any choice-of-law determination. Maybe not as sensational
as Return to the Valley of the Dolls, but at least as rational.
